



**U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General**

AUDIT REPORT

**FOLLOWUP OF RECOMMENDATIONS
RELATING TO THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS**

**REPORT NO. 98-I-468
MAY 1998**



United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Washington, D.C. 20240

AUDIT REPORT

MAY 29 1998

Honorable Roy L. Schneider
Governor of the Virgin Islands
No. 21 Kongens Gade
Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Islands 00802

Subject: Audit Report on **Followup** of Recommendations Relating to the Bureau of Corrections, Department of Justice, Government of the Virgin Islands (No. 98-I-468)

Dear Governor Schneider:

This report presents the results of our **followup** review of recommendations contained in four prior audit reports on the Bureau of Corrections, Virgin Islands Department of Justice (see Prior Audit Coverage). The objective of this review was to determine whether the Bureau had satisfactorily implemented the recommendations in the prior reports and whether any new recommendations were warranted.

BACKGROUND

The Bureau of Corrections was established within the Office of the Governor by Title 5, Chapter 401, of the Virgin Islands Code. In fiscal year 1987, the Bureau was placed under the administrative control of the Virgin Islands Department of Justice as a result of the Government's Executive Branch reorganization. The mission of the Bureau includes providing for the custody and care of inmates detained in correctional and detention facilities for felonies and misdemeanors. The Bureau's operating budget totaled \$12.7 million in fiscal year 1996 and \$13.8 million in fiscal year 1997.

The Director of Corrections is the chief administrator and fiscal officer of the Bureau and is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislature. The Bureau operates four correctional facilities within the Virgin Islands: the Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility and the Anna's Hope Adult Detention Center on St. Croix and the Alexander Farrelly Criminal Justice Complex and the Criminal Justice Complex Annex on St. Thomas. As of September 1997, these facilities housed more than 500 inmates, with another 190 inmates (including 70 inmates who were transferred to Arizona in July 1997) held in correctional facilities in the continental United States because of overcrowding conditions.

SCOPE OF AUDIT

To accomplish our audit objective, we reviewed documents and records pertaining to the Bureau's operations during fiscal years 1995 through 1997 and to policies and procedures in effect at the time of the audit. We also inspected the four facilities administered by the Bureau and interviewed Bureau and Virgin Islands Department of Justice personnel regarding actions taken to implement the prior audit recommendations.

Our review was made, as applicable, in accordance with the "Government Auditing Standards," issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Accordingly, we included such tests of records and other auditing procedures that were considered necessary under the circumstances. Because of the limited scope and objective of our review, we reviewed internal controls only to the extent that they related to corrective actions taken on the prior recommendations.

PRIOR AUDIT COVERAGE

From 1991 to 1993, the Office of Inspector General issued four audit reports on the Bureau, which disclosed deficiencies in the areas of security and maintenance; prison overcrowding; inmate care, rehabilitation, and safety; and administrative functions. The four audit reports contained a total of 45 recommendations on the Bureau of Corrections as follows:

- The August 1991 report "Security and Maintenance of Correctional Facilities, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 91-I-1188) stated that the Bureau of Corrections had not implemented adequate measures to ensure that correctional facilities in the Virgin Islands were secure and properly maintained. Specifically, the report noted that (1) inmates were not adequately monitored and supervised, (2) internal and perimeter security equipment and systems were not fully operable, (3) inmates and visitors were not adequately screened to prevent the introduction of contraband such as drugs and weapons, (4) a comprehensive preventive maintenance and repair program had not been established, and (5) available Federal funds for needed maintenance and repair were not used effectively. The report's 16 recommendations were classified as resolved but not implemented based on the Government's response to the report.

- The October 1991 report "Prison Overcrowding, Bureau of Corrections, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 92-I-90) stated that correctional facilities in the Virgin Islands housed 80 percent more inmates than their designed capacity. The report further stated that (1) the Bureau of Corrections had not effectively analyzed and planned for expansion of the prisons; (2) the Territorial and Federal Courts did not implement special sentencing programs which could assist in relieving overcrowding conditions; and (3) the Bureau improperly credited inmates with good conduct allowances that were not earned, which reduced inmates' prison sentences to less than court-ordered sentences. The report's five recommendations were classified as resolved but not implemented based on the Government's response to the report.

- The December 1992 report "Inmate Care, Rehabilitation, and Safety, Bureau of Corrections, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 93-I-363) stated that the Bureau of Corrections and the Department of Human Services, which was responsible for programs at the Youth Rehabilitation Center, had not adequately provided for the care, rehabilitation and safety of incarcerated individuals. Specifically, the report noted that (1) bathing and drinking water at correctional facilities was contaminated and unsafe for human use, (2) kitchen and medical facilities at the Golden Grove prison were not clean and were unsanitary, (3) the level of medical and dental services provided to inmates was inadequate, (4) existing educational programs were only to the fifth-grade level, (5) vocational and prison industries programs were not effective, (6) substance abuse treatment programs reached only a small percentage of the target inmate population, (7) emergency alarm systems and emergency exits were not functional, and (8) adequate fire fighting equipment was not available. The report's 10 recommendations were classified as unresolved based on the Government's response to the report.

- The March 1993 report "Personnel, Property Management, and Procurement Functions, Bureau of Corrections, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 93-I-670) stated that the Bureau of Corrections needed to make improvements in its personnel, property management, and procurement practices. Specifically, the report noted that the Bureau (1) did not adequately staff or properly utilize corrections officers, which resulted in overtime costs of about \$1.3 million annually; (2) did not always hire the most qualified officer candidates; (3) incurred excess salary costs of \$138,000 by using corrections officers to perform certain administrative duties; (4) did not develop a comprehensive, cost-effective training program for new recruits and for in-service training; (5) did not maintain current and accurate records of equipment and supplies; (6) did not comply with procurement regulations concerning the use of over-the-counter purchases; and (7) lost about \$37,000 in prompt payment discounts because of delayed payments to vendors. The report's 14 recommendations were classified as unresolved based on the Government's response to the report.

In addition, in January 1997, the Government of the Virgin Islands was cited by the U.S. District Court for failing to comply with a court order to reduce overcrowding, house mentally ill patients separately, and fix the deteriorating physical plant at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas. Our current review disclosed that the Government had not fully corrected these deficiencies.

RESULTS OF AUDIT

Of the 45 recommendations made in our four prior audit reports, we found that 7 recommendations were fully implemented, 22 recommendations were partially implemented, and 16 recommendations were not implemented. (A summary of the status of the recommendations is in Appendix 1, and the status of each recommendation and of the corrective actions taken is in Appendices 2 through 5.) We found that the Bureau took actions to (1) develop a plan to correct building deficiencies; (2) develop maintenance plans to meet the grant requirements of the Federal agencies which provided funds for the repair of correctional facilities; (3) institute a formal system for **classifying** inmates as to level of

risk; (4) provide uniforms to corrections officers and inmates; (5) provide inmates with medical and dental care, which included assigning a full-time registered nurse at the Golden Grove prison; (6) transfer the Youth Rehabilitation Center to the Department of Human Services; (7) provide a training facility on St. Croix for corrections officers; and (8) develop “post orders” (descriptions of required duties) for all corrections **officer** positions. However, we found that deficiencies disclosed in the prior reports still existed, primarily because (1) the Bureau did not have a permanent management team (the positions of Director, Assistant Director, Warden, and Assistant Warden were all vacant at the time of our follow-up review) which ensured that corrective actions were initiated and completed, (2) the prison facilities on St. Thomas and St. Croix did not have standard operating procedures and only the St. Thomas facilities had a comprehensive procedures manual, (3) corrections personnel did not always follow established procedures, and (4) the recommendations were not always implemented consistently on the two islands. As a result, physical security at the correctional facilities continued to be compromised, repair and maintenance problems existed, prison facilities were overcrowded, rehabilitative programs for inmates were not fully effective, and deficiencies related to **staffing** and training existed within the Bureau.

Security and Maintenance of Correctional Facilities

Regarding our August 1991 audit report on the security and maintenance of correctional facilities, our follow-up review determined that 3 of the 16 recommendations had been fully implemented, 12 had been partially implemented, and 1 had not been implemented (see Appendix 2). Although the Bureau had made improvements in the security and maintenance of correctional facilities, further improvements were needed in the areas of physical security, supervision of inmates, and inmate classification.

Physical Security. The Bureau did not have a comprehensive procedures manual for its St. Croix facilities that included specific policies on maintaining an adequate level of security within the facilities, disposing of contraband found in the facilities, and controlling the issuance of disposable razors to inmates. In addition, the Bureau allowed inmates at the Golden Grove prison to cover their cell door windows and lock cell doors from the inside. Further, corrections officers stationed in the perimeter guard towers at Golden Grove were not provided with firearms that could serve as a deterrent to inmates attempting to escape **from** the prison. At the Anna’s Hope facility, a secure control room with monitoring equipment was not available, and the plumbing needed to be repaired. On St. Thomas, access to the main control center at the Criminal Justice Complex was not restricted to authorized corrections officers, and there was no full-time maintenance unit. The emergency generator, ventilation system, and roof at the Criminal Justice Complex needed to be repaired.

We also found that the Bureau had not fully implemented the corrective action plan imposed on the Bureau by the U.S. District Court for improvements at the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix. Although improvements were made in the areas of emergency care, medication, and sanitation, the Bureau had not fully complied with the order in the areas of improving fire safety, screening windows, and controlling tools. For example, we found that the central

fire alarm system was inoperative, and the majority of dormitory windows were bent or missing or had large holes in them. As a result, inmates got wet when it rained, and many placed plastic bags or cardboard over the windows to prevent the rain from coming in. In addition, the majority of window screens in the dormitories were missing or had large holes in them.

Supervision of Inmates. The Bureau had formal procedures for the work detail programs at the correctional facilities on both islands. However, the established procedures were not always followed particularly at the Golden Grove facility. For example, of the 108 inmates enrolled in the work detail program on St. Croix, 24 maximum security prisoners, who had committed violent crimes such as first degree murder, were allowed to work in areas such as the farm, the carpentry shop, and the kitchen, where they had access to tools and other sharp objects that could be used in the conduct of violent acts against other inmates or prison personnel. In addition, we found that 12 inmates had not served at least one-third of their sentences, as required by established policies, before being considered for more independent work detail assignments. We also found that, on both islands, inmates enrolled in the work detail program were not always paid for their hours of work. Specifically, on St. Croix, inmates had not been paid since 1995 because the money allotted for that purpose was used for other Bureau expenses. Based on our review of records for the period of December 1995 to August 1996, we found that 150 inmates at the Golden Grove facility were owed about \$69,000 for that 9-month period.

Although inmates at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas were allowed to participate in work release programs based on the courts' sentencing orders, the Bureau did not have formal procedures for the work release program, and controls over inmates participating in the work release program were not adequate. For example, the only supervision of inmates in the work release program was in the form of occasional telephone calls made to the inmates' places of employment to determine whether they were at work. At the time of our follow-up review, the work release program was not active on St. Croix.

Inmate Classification. The Bureau did not ensure that emergency situations and unusual incidents which occurred in the correctional facilities were recorded in the facilities' logbooks. The number and the type of unusual incidents in the prisons were factors used by Bureau officials to reclassify inmates **from** maximum to medium security or from medium to minimum security. In addition, good conduct allowances, through which inmates' sentences were reduced for good behavior, were also based on the number and type of unusual incidents that occurred. However, because emergency situations and unusual incidents were not routinely recorded in the correctional facilities' logbooks for later transcription to the individual inmates' prison files, the potential existed for inmates to be given a less restrictive security classification or a greater level of good conduct allowances than was appropriate.

On St. Croix, cell assignments were not always appropriate based on the classification of the inmates. For example, we found that high-risk prisoners were housed in the same cells as low-risk prisoners at the Golden Grove facility. In one instance, a maximum security inmate who had been convicted of **first** degree murder and who was serving a mandatory life

sentence was housed in a medium security dormitory and shared a cell with an inmate who had committed robbery and had only 4 years remaining on a 10-year sentence. Another inmate convicted of first degree murder who was serving a mandatory life sentence shared a cell with an inmate who was serving his sentence on weekends. Moreover, because the Anna's Hope Detention Center did not have separate facilities for female detainees, maximum security inmates and minimum security detainees, along with mentally ill females, were housed together in the Golden Grove facility's female dormitory.

On St. Thomas, the Bureau made cell assignments without regard to inmate classifications. Specifically, all types of inmates, minimum to maximum security, were housed in the same cell clusters. We believe that this practice did not provide adequate physical security for the inmates, since the cell clusters at the Criminal Justice Complex were small. For example, one convicted murderer who was serving a life sentence plus additional years shared a cell with a minimum security inmate who was convicted for witness tampering. In addition, because the Criminal Justice Complex was frequently understaffed, proper supervision was not ensured. For example, one officer sometimes guarded two cell clusters simultaneously.

Prison Overcrowding

Regarding our October 1991 audit report on prison overcrowding, our **followup** review determined that two of the five recommendations had been partially implemented and that the remaining three had not been implemented (see Appendix 3). Specifically, although the Bureau made efforts to alleviate prison overcrowding, it had not developed a comprehensive plan to increase the overall capacity of prisons in the Virgin Islands. As a result, overcrowding still existed.

Overcrowding. The Criminal Justice Complex remained the most overcrowded correctional facility, with an occupancy of 151 inmates and detainees, which was 196 percent over the facility's design capacity of 51 inmates and detainees. We observed as many as four inmates occupying cells designed to hold an individual. As a result, inmates slept on mattresses placed on the floor, some of which were directly adjacent to toilets or under bunk beds. Although the Bureau had plans to complete renovation work on an annex to the Criminal Justice Complex, which would have a capacity of 52 inmates, we found that the renovation project was not progressing as intended because of insufficient funding.

Overcrowding was not as severe at the Golden Grove facility, where no more than two inmates were assigned to each cell in the male section of the prison. However, the female dormitory had one small room that contained seven bunk beds.

In an attempt to address the overcrowding, the Bureau, in July 1997, moved 70 inmates (40 from Golden Grove and 30 from the Criminal Justice Complex) to a correctional institution in Arizona. However, the Bureau's projected cost of incarceration for each inmate in Arizona was \$60 per day, or more than \$1.5 million per year, for the 70 inmates. The Bureau also transferred 24 inmates from the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas to the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix, thereby reducing some of the overcrowding observed at the St. Thomas facility.

Alternative Sentencing. During our **followup** review, we did not find any documentation that the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands had conducted a feasibility study on alternative sentencing programs, as had been recommended in our October 1991 audit report. However, the Territorial Court did make attempts to alleviate prison overcrowding by implementing an alternative sentencing program known as the Pre-trial Intervention Program. The purpose of this program was to give first-time misdemeanor offenders an opportunity to perform community service instead of going to prison. According to Territorial Court officials, about 500 individuals have participated in the Pre-trial Intervention Program since 1985.

Our follow-up review found that improvements were needed in the computation of good conduct allowances earned by inmates. Based on our review of the records for 20 inmates (10 on St. Thomas and 10 on St. Croix), we found that, for all of the inmates, the computed release dates based on good conduct allowances were in error by amounts ranging from 1 day to 6 1/2 months because of the mathematical formula used by the Bureau in computing good conduct allowances. In addition, we found that the longer the inmates' original sentences, the larger the discrepancies in the computation of good conduct release dates because of the longer time periods during which a discrepancy could be carried forward. Further, the Bureau had not developed written procedures that included minimum-to-maximum ranges for the forfeiture of good conduct allowances for subsequent **incidences** of misconduct, and there were no formal procedures for recording infractions, forfeited good time allowances, or adjustments to inmate release dates for misconduct in Bureau logbooks. As a result, the potential existed for inmates to be awarded good conduct allowances to which they were not entitled.

Inmate Care, Rehabilitation, and Safety

Regarding our December 1992 audit report on inmate care, rehabilitation, and safety, our follow-up review determined that 2 of the 10 recommendations had been fully implemented, 4 had been partially implemented, and 4 had not been implemented (see Appendix 4). Specifically, we found that 'although medical care had significantly improved, medications were not adequately supplied; substance abuse and other rehabilitative programs were not effective; and safety deficiencies existed' such as inoperative smoke detectors and emergency lighting, which could adversely affect inmate safety in an emergency situation.

Inmate Care. The Bureau took actions to improve the level of medical and dental care provided to inmates, including the assignment of a full-time registered nurse at the Golden Grove facility. However, at the Golden Grove facility, 67 types of medicines were completely or **almost** out of stock. Therefore, some inmates did not have the medications they needed on a regular basis, such as those needed to control high blood pressure or mental illness.

Regarding general cleanliness and sanitation, we found that the kitchen at the Criminal Justice Complex had not passed its most recent (March 1997) inspection by the Department of Health because food items in stock had expiration dates which had passed and also because insects were found in the kitchen area. We also noted that kitchen equipment and

utensils were blackened from years of use and were in generally poor operating condition. In addition, corrections officers were allowed to take home kitchen equipment, such as pots and pans, for personal use. Further, the Bureau was not providing inmates with personal hygiene items (such as toothpaste, toothbrushes, and deodorant) on a regular basis.

Rehabilitative Programs. We found that in fiscal year 1996, the Bureau received two grants through the Virgin Islands Law Enforcement Planning Commission for vocational education programs at the Golden Grove facility: \$150,000 to purchase tools and video training equipment and \$137,000 to purchase supplies. Although \$106,000 of the **first** grant and \$53,000 of the second grant had been expended through October 1996 to purchase such items, the Bureau had not officially started a vocational education program. However, classroom equipment had been purchased, and the classroom areas were being prepared.

During fiscal year 1996, the Bureau requested a grant budget adjustment whereby a 1 -year extension, through September 30, 1997, was approved by the Law Enforcement Planning Commission to begin the vocational education program at the Criminal Justice Complex. The Bureau identified a Government-owned building that could be used rent free for the program and earmarked \$2 1,000 of the grant to purchase equipment. However, at the time of our **followup** review, the program had not been started. Although the grant director wrote to the Acting Warden requesting required status reports on the rental of the building that could accommodate the vocational education program so that grant funds could be released, we found no documentation that the Bureau had responded to those requests.

Educational and substance abuse treatment programs were not effective. During fiscal years 1996 and 1997, the Law Enforcement Planning Commission also awarded Bureau grants totaling about \$400,000 to establish substance abuse treatment programs within the correctional facilities. Of that amount, \$175,000 was specifically earmarked for construction of separate facilities within the prisons to accommodate substance abusers. However, we found that the potential existed for the Bureau to lose the grant funds because it may not be able to use the funds for the construction of separate facilities or other program requirements by September 30, 1998. Law Enforcement Planning Commission personnel told us that if the grant funds were not used, they would be reprogrammed for use by the Youth Rehabilitation Center, which was operated by the Virgin Islands Department of Human Services. The potential also existed for the Government to lose an additional \$170,000 of the grant funds if a program for controlled substance testing is not implemented by September 1998. At the time of our **followup** review, the only substance abuse treatment program within the prisons consisted of occasional visits by representatives of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. Bureau officials told us that those meetings generally were not well attended by inmates.

On St. Thomas, improvements were also needed in the implementation of a comprehensive educational program for inmates. At the time of our **followup** review, the Bureau had two volunteers who taught basic education courses to seven inmates at the Criminal Justice Complex. However, a program had not been developed in coordination with the Department of Education, to help inmates acquire functional literacy or obtain General Education

Development high school equivalency certificates. In contrast, educational programs were fully operational on St. Croix.

We believe that, without effective substance abuse, vocational education, and basic education programs, inmates may not have the skills necessary to be successfully integrated into the community upon their release.

Inmate Safety. We found that the smoke detection system, emergency lighting, and exit signs at the Golden Grove facility were not working effectively. In addition, doors of the emergency exits at the Anna's Hope Detention Center could not be opened, and emergency keys were not easily accessible to corrections officers. These deficiencies could adversely affect inmate safety in an emergency situation such as a fire.

Personnel, Property Management, and Procurement Practices

Regarding our March 1993 report on personnel, property management, and procurement practices, our **followup** review determined that 2 of the 14 recommendations had been fully implemented, 4 had been partially implemented, and 8 had not been implemented (see Appendix 5). Specifically, the Bureau (1) was not recruiting and retaining an adequate number of qualified corrections officers, (2) did not have comprehensive pre-service and in-service training programs, and (3) had not implemented effective procedures to control its property management and procurement functions.

Recruitment and Retention. The Bureau continued to have a shortage of corrections officers, which resulted in overtime costs of \$1.4 million in fiscal year 1996 and \$446,000 in fiscal year 1997 (through April 1997). In addition, the Bureau hired individuals whose background investigations disclosed irregularities or potential reasons for not being hired. For example, we reviewed the personnel files for a sample of 21 officers and found that 2 applicants' background investigations had disclosed that their social security numbers and dates of birth were in conflict and that another 2 applicants had prior convictions or prior involvement with selling and using illegal drugs. The Bureau also hired three applicants without waiting for their entrance test scores, drug test results, or background investigation results. We found one instance in which a member of the Bureau's candidate selection committee provided a personal recommendation for an applicant who was hired. We believe that this personal recommendation may represent a conflict of interest on the part of the selection committee member. These discrepancies occurred, in part, because the Bureau did not have or follow formal policies and procedures for recruiting and hiring corrections officers.

Our **followup** review also disclosed that the Bureau did not have a **sufficient** number of administrative staff. As a result, corrections officers were assigned to administrative positions, such as payroll clerk, purchasing officer, property manager, and cook.

Although the Bureau issued policy memoranda regarding the use of overtime, we found that because of inadequate control, there was little assurance that time and attendance records were reconciled with the overtime approval records.

Training. The Bureau continued to operate without a territorial training coordinator, who would be responsible for providing overall supervision and coordination of staff training programs at all facilities operated by the Bureau. Although the Bureau included a training plan as part of its procedural manual for the St. Thomas facilities, the training plan was not implemented. In addition, we found that the training provided was not standardized in that newly hired corrections officers on St. Thomas received 7 weeks of pre-service training but newly hired corrections officers on St. Croix received 12 weeks of pre-service training. Further, we found that the personnel files for 14 corrections officers who had been on the job over 1 year did not contain any documentation that they had received the 40 hours of annual in-service training required by the corrections officers' union contract.

Property Management and Procurement. The Bureau did not have formal property management procedures to ensure that Government identification numbers were affixed to all equipment. In addition, inventory control procedures for materials and supplies were inadequate. For example, although Bureau personnel on St. Croix maintained perpetual inventory cards and performed weekly physical inventories, the inventory results were not reconciled with the inventory cards; therefore, the cards did not accurately reflect the results of the physical inventories. Additionally, the property officer was responsible for procuring, receiving, and distributing supplies, which resulted in a lack of segregation of duties. Further, access to the supply storeroom was not restricted during the weekend, when the property officer was off duty. On St. Thomas, the acting property officer did not maintain perpetual inventory cards or perform periodic physical inventories. We also found that the Bureau had not established policies and procedures to ensure that purchases were not split on over-the-counter purchases.¹

Recommendations

We recommend that the Governor of the Virgin Islands require the Bureau of Corrections to:

1. Reconsider the 38 recommendations in the prior audit reports that have not been fully implemented (see Appendices 1-5) and develop a plan which identifies the specific corrective actions to be taken and includes titles of responsible officials and target dates to achieve full implementation of these recommendations.
2. Take necessary actions to expeditiously fill the Bureau positions of Director, Assistant Director, Warden, and Assistant Warden.
3. Ensure that Bureau personnel at the St. Croix facilities adopt the procedures manual used by personnel at the St. Thomas facilities to provide consistent policies and procedures for operations at all of the Bureau's correctional facilities.

*Title 3 1, Section 239(3), of the Virgin Islands Code states that purchases in amounts not to exceed \$5,000 may be made on the open market without using competitive procurement procedures. However, not more than one such purchase may be made **from** the same vendor for the same goods or services within a **30-day** period.

4. Establish procedures which ensure that adequate supervision is provided to inmates who are allowed to leave the correctional facilities on work release assignments and that inmates are promptly paid for work performed under the work release and work detail programs. In addition, the recently developed procedures for operating the work detail program should be implemented.

5. Evaluate the level of staff resources and take actions to ensure that the correctional facilities are adequately staffed to maintain a reasonable level of security at all times and to minimize the need for overtime work by existing staff.

6. Revise the existing recruitment and retention policies to ensure that all applicants for corrections officer positions are properly qualified and pass all pre-hiring tests and background investigations before they are hired. In addition, the Bureau should adopt procedures to ensure that candidate selection committee members do not compromise their independence by giving personal recommendations for applicants.

Governor of the Virgin Islands Response and Office of Inspector General Reply


On March 19, 1998, we transmitted a draft of this report to you requesting a response by May 8, 1998. At the request of your Special Assistant for Audit and Policy Evaluation, we granted an extension until May 15, 1998. However, a response to the draft report has not been provided. Therefore, since this final report is being issued without benefit of your response, all of the recommendations are considered unresolved (see Appendix 6).

The Inspector General Act, Public Law 95-452, Section 5(a)(3), as amended, requires semiannual reporting to the U.S. Congress on all audit reports issued, actions taken to implement audit recommendations, and identification of each significant recommendation on which corrective action has not been taken.

In view of the above, please provide a response, as required by Public Law 97-357, to this report by June 30, 1998. The response should be addressed to our Caribbean Regional Office, Federal Building - Room 207, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802. The response should provide the information requested in Appendix 6.

We appreciate the assistance of Bureau personnel in the conduct of our audit.

Sincerely,



Robert J. Williams
Acting Inspector General

SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>Audit Report Subject</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Fully Implemented</u>	<u>Partially Implemented</u>	<u>Not Implemented</u>
Security and Maintenance (Appendix 2)	16	3	12	1
Prison Overcrowding (Appendix 3)	5	0	2	3
Inmate Care, Rehabilitation, and Safety (Appendix 4)	10	2	4	4
Personnel, Property Management, and Procurement Practices (Appendix 5)	<u>14</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>
Total	<u>45</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>16</u>

**STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
“SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE OF
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS”
(No. 91-1-I 188)**

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
A. 1. Develop and implement a comprehensive procedures manual for the Bureau of Corrections which includes specific policies with regard to the maintenance of an adequate level of security and control at all correctional facilities.	Partially implemented. The Bureau developed and implemented a comprehensive procedures manual, which was being used at the two correctional facilities on St. Thomas. The manual addressed issues such as security and maintenance, control of inmates, and health services. We found copies of the manual at all corrections officer posts in the St. Thomas facilities. However, a comprehensive procedures manual had not been implemented at the correctional facilities on St. Croix. Although the Bureau's St. Croix branch had written procedures for certain areas, such as inmate work assignments and inmate classification, written guidance was lacking for most operational areas.
A.2. Institute and enforce procedures to ensure (a) that accurate and complete inmate counts are conducted in accordance with established time frames and that the results of such counts are recorded in a logbook; (b) that routine information, emergency situations, and unusual incidents are recorded in the logbook; and (c) that the practice of	Partially implemented. We found, by reviewing all logbooks located in the cell clusters at the facilities on St. Thomas, that inmate counts were conducted by the corrections officers every hour on the hour. In addition, the Criminal Justice Complex had a “15-minute log book” in which corrections officers logged a quick walk-through inspection of the clusters

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>allowing prisoners to cover their cell door windows and lock their cell doors from the inside is discontinued.</p>	<p>every 15 minutes. We found, by reviewing all logbooks located in the prison dormitories at the facilities on St. Croix, that inmate counts were conducted by the corrections officers four times daily. However, there were no written procedures specifying the frequency or the manner in which inmate counts should be made.</p>
<p>A.3. Develop and enforce formal procedures for the work detail and work release programs. These procedures should (a) clearly define the eligibility requirements for each program, (b) specify types of crimes which would prohibit an inmate from participating in the programs, and (c) ensure adequate controls over inmates while they are participating in the programs.</p>	<p>We also found that the Bureau was not recording emergency situations and unusual incidents in logbooks. In addition, the practice of allowing prisoners to cover their cell door windows and lock cell doors from the inside existed at the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix.</p> <p>Partially implemented. The Bureau had formal procedures for the work detail programs at the facilities on both islands. Those procedures clearly defined the eligibility requirements for each work detail program, specified the types of crimes that would prohibit an inmate from participating in the programs, and ensured that adequate controls existed over inmates while they were participating in the programs. However, we found that the established procedures were not always followed at the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix.</p>
	<p>The Bureau did not have an active work release program on St. Croix, and the work release program on St. Thomas was based on specific court orders. However, formal procedures were not developed for the work release program, and no specific controls were in place for inmates participating in the program.</p>

Recommendations

A.4. Develop post orders for all correction officer positions and ensure that these orders are available to and understood by the respective officers.

A.5. Develop and enforce formal procedures for controlling contraband within the correctional facilities. These procedures should include provisions for (a) screening visitors and items brought to the facilities by visitors, (b) limiting physical contact between visitors and inmates, (c) requiring periodic unannounced shakedowns of inmates and cell areas, (d) disposing of contraband that is discovered in the facilities, and (e) taking actions against inmates and others who bring contraband into the facilities or are found possessing contraband.

Status of Corrective Actions

Partially implemented. Post orders were developed for all corrections officer positions on both islands and were made available to all respective officers. However, on St. Croix, some of the orders were dated as long ago as 1977 and were probably obsolete. On that island, post orders were also issued in the form of program statements issued by the former warden. We found that at least three senior corrections officers were not aware of the existence of these program statements.

Partially implemented. Procedures for controlling contraband within the correctional facilities were included in the procedures manual developed on St. Thomas. However, these procedures were not always followed' especially regarding shakedowns and disposal of contraband. We found that virtually no records were kept on shakedowns or the disposal of contraband. In addition, our review of prison logbooks for a 6-month period found that only one shakedown was conducted and that this was only a partial search conducted in two of the seven cell clusters.

St. Croix had unwritten policies regarding shakedowns, with the chief or acting chief corrections officer determining the disposition of confiscated items, such as drugs or weapons, and determining when senior-level authorities should be called in. During our review, we noticed that disposable razors were issued to prisoners by the Bureau's procurement officer but that the razors were not picked up by

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
	corrections officers when inmates were finished shaving. We also found that disposable razors could be bought by any prisoner from the prison commissary. A review of incident reports in inmate files disclosed that razors had been used as weapons during prison disturbances.
A.6. Develop a plan to correct building deficiencies which result in inadequate security and control for all facilities. This plan should address, at a minimum, (a) reconstruction of guard towers, (b) installation of perimeter and other security alarm systems, (c) repair of surveillance equipment, and (d) repair of locking mechanisms in all cells and other secured areas.	Implemented. A plan was developed and implemented. We found that guard towers at the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix were reconstructed and a new guard tower was positioned on the western side of the prison's perimeter. In addition, a new perimeter fence was constructed and linked to the control room to notify corrections officers if anything pressed against the fence. Locking mechanisms in all cells and perimeter areas were repaired at the time that cell doors were replaced in 1995.
	On St. Thomas, the surveillance equipment was repaired and was in good working condition. In addition, all electronic locking mechanisms for the doors and cells in the facility were in good working condition. These repairs were also completed in 1995.
A.7. Acquire sufficient communication equipment and firearms for correction officers assigned to inmate and perimeter areas of the facilities.	Partially implemented. The Bureau provided corrections officers with sufficient communication equipment. All officers in inmate areas had both a hand held radio and a telephone, which were used to contact the control areas of the prisons. However, continued improvements for perimeter security are needed at the Golden Grove facility.

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>A.8. Institute procedures and physical layout changes to ensure that access to control centers at all facilities are restricted to authorized officers and that alarm, communication, surveillance, and other systems are controlled from within the control centers.</p>	<p>Partially implemented. The Bureau did implement physical layout changes to ensure that alarms, communication, surveillance, and locking mechanisms were controlled from the center. However, procedures to ensure that access to the control center was restricted to authorized corrections officers had not been implemented at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas. All corrections officers and civilian employees at the facility had access to the control center.</p>
<p>A.9. Develop formal procedures for the control of firearms, security equipment, and tools and culinary equipment. These procedures should (a) limit access to storage areas to authorized personnel, (b) include actions to ensure that corrections officers are strictly accountable for weapons assigned to them, and (c) provide for monthly physical inventories of the weapons.</p>	<p>At the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix, access to the control center was restricted to authorized corrections officers, and all prison systems, including fire and perimeter alarm systems, were monitored from the control room. The Anna's Hope Detention Center on St. Croix did not have perimeter alarms or a formal control room. However, the control area was moved away from the visitor's desk, where it was located at the time of the prior audit.</p> <p>Partially implemented. Formal procedures for the control of firearms, security equipment, and tools and culinary equipment were developed and implemented as part of the procedures manual for St. Thomas. However, the established procedures were not always followed. Specifically, weapons were not stored away from the facility, monthly inventories of weapons were not conducted, officers were not required to sign out for weapons assigned to them, and unauthorized Bureau employees had access to the weapons.</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>A. 10. Provide uniforms to all correction officers and inmates that distinguish officers from prisoners. Correction officers and inmates should be required to wear the uniforms.</p>	<p>Written policies and procedures had not been developed for St. Croix for the control of firearms, security equipment, tools, and culinary equipment.</p> <p>Additionally, regular inventories of firearms were not conducted. In September 1996, several weapons were found to be missing from the armory at the Golden Grove facility, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was called by Bureau of Corrections officials to investigate the disappearances. Subsequently, the locks at the armory were changed, and only the acting assistant chief had the keys.</p> <p>Implemented. We observed that all corrections officers at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas were in full uniform. In addition, all inmates were in full inmate uniforms when they were outside of their cell clusters. On St. Croix, the corrections officers' uniforms were generally faded and in short supply. However, despite this factor, we observed that corrections officers were easily distinguished from the inmates, who were in full inmate uniforms or in grey and white clothing while on laundry duty or in recreational status.</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>A. 11. Institute a formal system for classifying inmates as to level of risk and make cell assignments so that low-risk inmates are separated from violent high-risk prisoners.</p>	<p>Partially implemented. The Bureau had standard policies on both islands for classifying inmates as to level of risk. However, our reviews of cell assignments disclosed that the policies were not always complied with at the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix. We noted instances in which high-risk prisoners were housed in the same cells as low-risk prisoners, including the dormitory housing female prisoners at Golden Grove.</p> <p>On St. Thomas, cell assignments were not made with regard to inmate classifications. All types of inmates, from low- to high-risk, were housed in the same cell clusters.</p>
<p>B. 1. Develop a comprehensive preventive maintenance plan for the Bureau of Corrections. The preventive maintenance plan should (a) identify specific plant and equipment items which require regular maintenance, (b) specify the minimum inspection interval for such items, (c) provide standards and procedures for completing regular maintenance, (d) provide procedures for documenting the completion of regular inspections and actual maintenance provided, and (e) provide procedures for handling special repair and maintenance needs in a timely manner.</p>	<p>Not implemented. The Bureau did not implement a comprehensive maintenance plan for any of its correctional facilities. Although monthly preventive maintenance checklists were prepared for the Golden Grove facility and the Anna's Hope Detention Center on St. Croix, such checklists were not available on St. Thomas.</p>
<p>B.2. Take the actions necessary to implement the corrective action plan developed in response to the 1986 consent decree concerning the Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility.</p>	<p>Partially implemented. Although some progress was made on implementing the corrective action plan for the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix, some deficiencies still existed. We found that, although improvements were made in the</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>B.3. Provide the Bureau with the resources necessary to staff a full-time maintenance unit consisting of a sufficient number of qualified maintenance personnel at each correctional facility.</p>	<p>areas of emergency care, medication, and some sanitation issues, the Bureau was not in full compliance in the areas of providing fire safety, screening windows, and controlling tools.</p> <p>Partially implemented. On St. Croix, the Bureau created a full-time maintenance unit at the Golden Grove facility in March 1997.</p>
<p>B.4. Take immediate action to correct the repair and maintenance deficiencies noted by our audit and other studies performed for the Government of the Virgin Islands by Federal Bureau of Prisons and National Association of Corrections experts.</p>	<p>On St. Thomas, the Bureau hired a civilian in 1995 to be its maintenance engineer, but there was no full-time maintenance unit. Additionally, despite the presence of the maintenance engineer, we noted numerous maintenance problems at the Criminal Justice Complex, including needed repairs of the emergency generator, the ventilation system, and the roof.</p> <p>Partially implemented. Most of the repair and maintenance problems disclosed by our prior audit and studies conducted by the corrections experts have been corrected. Light fixtures, cameras, monitors, and plumbing were all found to be in working condition at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas. In addition, all doors and locks in the cell areas, which were previously operated by draw bolt, had electrical buttons or dead bolts.</p> <p>At the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix, most of the repair and maintenance deficiencies have been corrected by the Bureau. However, most windows in the dormitories were in disrepair and were bent, could not be opened and</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
	<p>closed (which caused inmates to get wet when it rained), or were completely missing. In addition, the majority of the window screens in the dormitories were missing or had large holes in them.</p> <p>Conditions at the Anna's Hope Detention Center were essentially unchanged from the time of the prior audit. We found that most of the urinals and toilets were inoperative and that the ones which were working were in an unsanitary condition.</p>
<p>B.5. Take immediate action to develop maintenance plans required to meet the requirements of the U.S. Department of Interior, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency grants for prison renovation and expansion to correct noted deficiencies.</p>	<p>Implemented. We reviewed correspondence which showed that the Bureau developed maintenance plans required to meet the requirements of two of the three grantor agencies. Additionally, although Bureau officials could not locate documentation concerning the submission of the maintenance plans to the U.S. Marshals Service, we found that the Bureau received the grant from the Marshals Service, which we believe indicates that the Service was satisfied with the Bureau's maintenance plans.</p>

**STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
“PRISON OVERCROWDING,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS”
(No. 92-I-90)**

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>A. 1. Develop and implement a comprehensive plan to increase the available prison capacity in the Virgin Islands. This plan should consider (a) realistic projections of future needs, considering the high level of crime, and longer mandatory sentences; (b) the return of inmates currently housed in Federal prisons to the Virgin Islands; (c) the level to which existing prison facilities can meet capacity needs; (d) special facilities and programs to provide inmates with medical, substance abuse, and mental health treatment and a variety of rehabilitative services; (e) physical layout, including security and isolation measures to protect the general community; and (f) detailed cost estimates and potential funding sources, including the possibility of Federal funding and the issuance of bonds.</p>	<p>Not implemented. The Bureau of Corrections did not develop a comprehensive plan to increase the prison capacity in the Virgin Islands. As a result, the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas was filled to 196 percent of its design capacity. Cells at the Complex that were designed to hold one inmate housed as many as four inmates.</p> <p>In an attempt to address the problem of overcrowding, in July 1997, Bureau officials moved 70 inmates to an institution in Arizona. They also transferred 24 inmates from the Criminal Justice Complex to the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix. However, the total projected cost of incarceration for the inmates in Arizona will be \$1.5 million per year.</p>
<p>A.2. Encourage the Territorial Court to conduct a feasibility study of implementing alternative sentencing programs in the Virgin Islands. If such programs are found to be feasible, legislation should be submitted to allow the Territorial Court to consider alternative sentencing programs when sentencing non-violent convicted criminals. Thereafter, the Territorial Court</p>	<p>Partially implemented. The Territorial Court implemented an alternative sentencing program known as the Pre-trial Intervention Program. This program allowed first time offenders who committed misdemeanor crimes to participate in a community-based program rather than to serve time in prison. However, neither a feasibility study nor legislation concerning</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
should establish policies and procedures for the operation of such programs.	alternative sentencing was developed.
B. 1. Recompute good conduct allowances earned for all inmates serving sentences to ensure that good conduct allowances are credited in accordance with the Virgin Islands Code. This recomputation should include crediting good conduct allowances to inmates only for the full months they served and excluding months in which infractions were committed or forfeitures were ordered.	Partially implemented. Good conduct allowances were recomputed, but we found that the allowances were not accurate. As a result, we did not find any instances in which an inmate was released on the correct release date.
B.2. Establish written procedures for the forfeiture of accumulated good time for misconduct. These procedures should include minimum-to-maximum ranges for the forfeiture of good time for each type of infraction and should be included in the penalties listed in the Bureau's Rules for Inmate Conduct.	Not implemented. Although penalties for committing infractions were included in written procedures for St. Thomas, the procedures did not contain any ranges for the forfeiture of good time allowances for each infraction. The facilities on St. Croix did not have written procedures for the forfeiture of good time for misconduct.
B.3. Establish written procedures to ensure that inmates' official records document the infractions committed and the forfeitures of good conduct allowances ordered and that inmate release dates are adjusted to reflect the amount of good conduct time disallowed or forfeited for infractions of Bureau rules.	Not implemented. Although the procedures manual for St. Thomas contained a section on inmate classification, it did not include any procedures for recording infractions, good time forfeited' or the adjustment of inmate release dates. There were no written procedures at the facilities on St. Croix to ensure that inmates' official records documented the infractions committed, the forfeiture of good conduct allowances ordered, and the adjustment of inmate release dates.

**STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
“INMATE CARE, REHABILITATION, AND SAFETY,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS”
(No. 93-I-363)**

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>A. 1. Develop and implement a comprehensive system, including formal written policies and procedures, to correct deficiencies in sanitation and personal hygiene conditions. The system should (a) require at least monthly sanitation inspections by Bureau sanitation specialists and annual inspections by the Virgin Islands Department of Health; (b) provide inmates with clean and safe water for drinking and bathing; and (c) provide inmates with personal hygiene items such as soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs, and toilet paper.</p>	<p>Not implemented. The Bureau did not develop a comprehensive system, including written policies and procedures, to correct the identified deficiencies. Although the Bureau provided clean and safe water for drinking and bathing purposes for inmates at all facilities by installing ultraviolet water purifiers at both facilities on St. Croix and by receiving monthly water safety tests by an outside contractor on St. Thomas, monthly sanitation inspections were not conducted at any facility. In March 1997, the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas did not pass an inspection conducted by the Department of Health. In addition, on both St. Thomas and St. Croix, the Bureau did not provide personal hygiene items such as soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs, and toilet paper to inmates on a consistent basis. These items were regularly in short supply at all facilities.</p>
<p>A.2. Develop and implement a comprehensive system, including formal written policies and procedures, to correct deficiencies in food service operations. The system should (a) provide for routine cleaning of the kitchen facilities and equipment and (b) ensure that kitchen</p>	<p>Partially implemented. The Bureau established standard operating procedures that included procedures to correct the identified deficiencies for St. Thomas. However, we found that many of the sanitation deficiencies continued to exist. For example, during its inspection of</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
equipment and fixtures are in good operating condition.	the Criminal Justice Complex, the Department of Health found that some food items were past their expiration dates and toxic materials were stored on the same shelves as food items. We also found that kitchen equipment and fixtures were blackened and in poor operating condition from years of use without repair or replacement.
A.3. Develop and implement a comprehensive system, including formal written policies and procedures, to correct deficiencies in medical and dental services. The system should (a) provide a full-time registered nurse for the Golden Grove Correctional Facility and (b) provide inmates and juvenile offenders with preventive and general dental care.	Sanitation procedures had not been developed for the facilities on St. Croix, and the kitchen at Golden Grove had been operating without a health permit for 3 years. Despite these deficiencies, we noted that the kitchen equipment and fixtures were clean and in good operating condition. Implemented. A comprehensive plan was established to provide medical and dental care to inmates at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas. Preventive and general dental care was provided by a contracted dentist. We did note, however, that the nurse's station was frequently manned by a licensed practical nurse without the supervision of a registered nurse, who would have been trained to deal with emergency situations.
B. 1. Introduce legislation to amend Title 5, Chapter 40 1, of the Virgin Islands Code to allow the Bureau of Corrections to require inmates to participate in prison	The Bureau provided a full-time registered nurse for the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix and also provided preventive and general dental care to inmates in a medical and dental facility constructed within the prison complex. Not implemented. Legislation was never introduced, and participation in the work programs continues to be voluntary.

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
work programs unless they are participating in an approved educational or vocational training program.	
B.2. Ensure that a comprehensive educational program for incarcerated individuals with courses leading to functional literacy and achievement of a General Education Development (GED) high school equivalency certificate is established and implemented in coordination with the Department of Education. Incentives should be implemented to encourage inmates who have not achieved the level of education commensurate with their age to participate in the educational program.	<p>Partially implemented. The Bureau established and implemented an educational program with courses leading to literacy and achievement of a GED diploma for inmates at the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix. Classrooms were set up in the facility, and 52 inmates were enrolled, with 30 inmates in either the advanced GED or pre-GED groups. Five inmates have already graduated from the GED program. In addition, the Bureau established literacy programs for inmates who could not read or write. Inmates were recruited, and incentives for participation were provided, including contact visits and graduation exercises to which the inmates' families were invited.</p> <p>Although Federal funds were available, the Bureau did not provide classes on St. Thomas that would prepare inmates for the achievement of a GED diploma or that would lead to their achievement of functional literacy. We found that St. Thomas inmates had the opportunity to attend only adult basic education classes which were taught by two volunteer teachers. These classes were held 3 days a week in a small room at the Criminal Justice Complex that also serves as a library, and only seven inmates participated.</p>
B.3. Establish and implement a comprehensive program of vocational and prison industries activities to afford inmates the opportunity to learn skills to	<p>Not implemented. The Bureau had not established and implemented a comprehensive vocational program at any of the correctional facilities. The Golden</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>help them obtain employment when released from prison. Incentives should be provided to encourage inmates to participate in at least one such vocational or prison industries activity. Inmates who choose not to participate should be required to perform other work within the correctional facilities.</p>	<p>Grove facility on St. Croix had limited vocational programs in the fields of carpentry, automotive repair, and agriculture, but these programs were used primarily for work detail purposes. However, we found that the Bureau was in the final stages of developing a comprehensive vocational and prison industries program and had received two grants for this purpose through the Virgin Islands Law Enforcement Planning Commission.</p>
<p>B.4. Establish and implement a comprehensive substance abuse program and actively encourage inmates with substance abuse problems to participate in the program.</p>	<p>There were no vocational programs for inmates at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas. The Criminal Justice Complex Annex had a carpentry shop in which two inmates who were skilled in carpentry made mahogany clocks and other items for sale at the island's annual agricultural fairs. However, the program was not designed to provide vocational education to unskilled inmates.</p>
<p>B.5. Provide the Department of Human Services with the funding necessary to accomplish the planned transfer of the Youth Rehabilitation Center from the Bureau of Corrections and establish comprehensive educational, vocational, substance abuse, and other rehabilitative programs for juvenile offenders.</p>	<p>Not implemented. Although the Virgin Islands Law Enforcement Planning Commission made about \$400,000 available to the Bureau for the establishment of substance abuse programs, such programs had not been established at any of the correctional facilities.</p>
	<p>Implemented. The Youth Rehabilitation Center was transferred to the Department of Human Services from the Bureau of Corrections in 1993. Comprehensive educational programs presented by the Department of Education were established at the Center, along with programs in horticulture, air conditioning and refrigeration repair, and electronics.</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>C. 1. Improve the emergency capabilities of all correctional facilities by (a) installing centralized smoke detection and alarm systems, (b) ensuring that all emergency exits are operational, and (c) providing those correction officers on duty in inmate living areas with emergency keys.</p>	<p>Counselors were also provided for substance abusers.</p> <p>Partially implemented. Although emergency capabilities were improved at all correctional facilities, several deficiencies existed. On St. Croix, we found that centralized smoke detectors and alarm systems were installed at both facilities. However, the system at the Golden Grove facility was inoperative at the time of our review. Golden Grove also had a working centralized alarm system to notify corrections officers of any activity at the perimeter fences. All emergency exits were working at Golden Grove, and all officers had access to emergency keys.</p> <p>However, we found that the Anna's Hope facility on St. Croix still did not have a perimeter alarm system and that several emergency doors could not be opened. In addition, keys were not easily accessible and identifiable during an emergency because they were kept on rings with a large number of other keys.</p>
<p>C.2. Obtain new or repair existing fire fighting equipment to ensure that all correctional facilities meet minimum standards necessary to pass fire inspections by the Virgin Islands Fire Service. This equipment should include an adequate number of fire extinguishers,</p>	<p>On St. Thomas, the smoke detection and monitoring systems were in good operating condition, all emergency exits were in an operative condition, and keys were accessible to the corrections officers on duty in inmate living areas.</p> <p>Partially implemented. On St. Croix, the Fire Service had not conducted a fire safety inspection at the Golden Grove facility in 1 and 1/2 years. At that time, although most sections of the prison passed the inspection, the Fire Service found problems with the smoke detection</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>emergency lighting, continuously illuminated exit signs, and operational fire hydrants or water standpipes.</p>	<p>and electrical systems. We found that a major deficiency at the facility was a lack of maintenance of fire extinguishers in the dormitory areas. More than one-half of the extinguishers needed recharging and therefore were inoperative. Bureau officials had the extinguishers recharged when we brought this problem to their attention. We also found that, although emergency lighting was sufficient, there were no lighted exit signs in any of the dormitory areas. We also found that none of the fire hydrants at or around the Golden Grove facility were working.</p> <p>We could not locate a Fire Service inspection report for the Anna's Hope Detention Center. We found that fire extinguishers were available in all areas of the Center, but several smoke detectors were inoperative. To repel mosquitoes, detainees were allowed to use fire-lighted pieces of rolled up toilet paper, which constituted a fire hazard. Also, there were no lighted exit signs or emergency lighting at the Center.</p> <p>On St. Thomas, Fire Service inspections were conducted at the Criminal Justice Complex on a regular basis. We also found that all fire extinguishers were in working condition, there were illuminated exit signs over all doors, and an adequate number of water standpipes were available. However, according to the Fire Service inspection reports, the Bureau needed to make improvements in the facility's ventilation system and manual fire alarms. We also noted that emergency lighting at the Complex was inoperative.</p>

**STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
“PERSONNEL, PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
AND PROCUREMENT PRACTICES,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS”
(No. 93-I-670)**

<u>Recommendations</u>	<u>Status of Corrective Actions</u>
A. 1. Establish a comprehensive correction officer recruitment and retention program, similar to the one recommended in September 1991 by the Bureau’s training supervisor, to ensure that the Bureau has a sufficient number of correction officers to provide adequate security at correctional facilities and to reduce the amount of overtime work necessary to maintain such security.	Not implemented. The Bureau did not establish a comprehensive officer recruitment and retention program for any of its facilities. As a result, the Bureau continued to experience shortages of corrections officers, resulting in overtime costs of \$1.4 million in fiscal year 1996 and \$445,952 in fiscal year 1997 (through April 30, 1997).
A.2. Establish written payroll policies and procedures to ensure that time and attendance records are reconciled to approved overtime slips and that officers are prohibited from accumulating approved overtime slips.	Not implemented. Although the Bureau issued memoranda outlining overtime procedures, the Bureau did not establish detailed written payroll policies and procedures to ensure that time and attendance records were reconciled to approved overtime records.
A.3. Reconcile the time and attendance records for the 66 correction officers identified in our sample who were either overpaid or underpaid for overtime work and make the necessary payroll adjustments to correct these errors.	Not implemented. We found that payroll transactions were not consistently recorded, resulting in overpayments and underpayments to corrections officers.

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
A.4. Provide the Bureau with sufficient administrative staff so that the practice of assigning noncorrection duties to correction officers can be discontinued.	Not implemented. The Bureau continued to have a shortage of administrative staff that resulted in the assignment of corrections officers to perform administrative duties. On St. Croix, corrections officers were assigned to positions of classification officer, purchasing officer, and cashier. On St. Thomas, corrections officers held administrative positions of payroll clerk, property management officer, and cook.
A.5. Establish policies and procedures to ensure that recommendations by the Bureau's Selection Committee and background investigation reports are considered and that Bureau actions contrary to those recommendations are fully documented and justified.	Not implemented. Policies and procedures were not established to ensure that the Committee's recommendations and background investigations were considered in the selection of corrections officer candidates. In addition, minutes of Committee meetings were not maintained. We found that, as a result, discrepancies identified by background investigations were sometimes ignored and there was little assurance that the Committee's recommendations were taken into consideration.
B. 1. Establish and fill a position for a territorial training coordinator, who would be responsible for overall supervision and coordination of staff training programs at all facilities operated by the Bureau of Corrections.	Not implemented. A territorial training coordinator was not hired, and the Bureau was without the services of an official responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of staff training programs.
B.2. Develop and implement a comprehensive, formal training plan for use in administering the Bureau of Corrections staff training program. This plan should include the establishment of written training policies and procedures and a requirement that the training plan should be evaluated and updated annually. Implementation of the training plan should ensure that (a) training courses are	Partially implemented. A comprehensive, formal training plan was included in the St. Thomas procedures manual. However, the manual did not contain the specific items recommended in the prior audit, such as the type and length of required training, and the manual's training procedures were not complied with. In addition, a comprehensive training plan had not been developed for St. Croix.

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>conducted in a cost effective manner, with consideration to minimum class sizes and efficient scheduling of classes; (b) the annual training budget is sufficient to meet the training needs of all correction officers; (c) the type and length of pre-service, in-service, and specialized training courses offered on St. Thomas and St. Croix are standardized; (d) policies and procedures are established to evaluate pre-service, in-service, and specialized training programs on an ongoing basis; and (e) accurate and complete training information is maintained for each correction officer to identify the type and number of hours of training received.</p>	<p>Because the two islands were not using the same training policies and procedures, training courses were not standardized. Further, complete records were not maintained on the training received by corrections officers.</p> <p>We also found that because the Bureau did not budget or receive funds for a training program, corrections officers who conducted training classes were not provided with the equipment necessary to conduct the training and that they purchased classroom supplies with personal funds.</p>
<p>B.3. Discontinue the practice of allowing new employees to function as correction officers before they have successfully completed pre-service training requirements.</p>	<p>Partially implemented. Although the practice of assigning new employees to function as corrections officers before they completed pre-service training was discontinued on St. Croix, this practice continued on St. Thomas. We also noted that new employees did not receive firearms training until periods of up to 4 months after they completed other pre-service training.</p>
<p>B.4. Ensure that the training supervisor is allowed to perform the full duties and responsibilities of the position.</p>	<p>Not implemented. Training supervisors were not able to perform the full duties and responsibilities of their positions because of the lack of a training budget.</p>
<p>B.5. Require that all correction officers meet annual requirements for pre-service, in-service, and specialized training. To ensure that these requirements are met, officers who do not attend scheduled courses should be rescheduled; officers should successfully complete and achieve</p>	<p>Partially implemented. Corrections officers met annual requirements for pre-service training, but the amount of training received by officers on St. Thomas and St. Croix differed because of the lack of a standardized training plan. Officers on St. Thomas received about 7</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
<p>passing grades in each course; and officers should receive required training in the use of firearms, emergency first aid, and riot control.</p>	<p>weeks of training as compared with the 3 months of training received by corrections officers on St. Croix.</p>
<p>B.6. Provide a suitable training facility on St. Croix to conduct classes in a safe and controlled environment.</p>	<p>Annual training and specialized training requirements were not met by the Bureau. None of the officers reviewed received the mandatory 40 hours of in-service training required by union contracts, and specialized training courses were not provided for all corrections officers. Specifically, 10 officers did not receive firearms training, 9 officers did not receive self-defense training, and 1 officer did not receive cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training.</p> <p>Implemented. A facility with a safe and controlled environment suitable for training was provided at the Department of Justice's Toro Building location on St. Croix.</p>
<p>C.1. Require that Bureau of Corrections officials comply with the provisions of Title 3 1, Section 242, of the Virgin Islands Code and the Government's Property Manual regarding the control of equipment and supplies. To ensure compliance, the Bureau should (a) implement standardized property control procedures, (b) maintain accurate and complete property records, (c) establish procedures to ensure that property numbers are assigned and affixed to items, (d) perform physical inventories and reconcile inventory results to property records, (e) segregate accounting and physical control duties at each storeroom location, and (f) limit storeroom access to authorized personnel.</p>	<p>Partially implemented. The Bureau did, not comply with property control requirements, and standardized property control procedures were not implemented to ensure that property numbers were assigned and affixed on all equipment. Regarding supplies, on St. Croix, the Bureau prepared property cards for each item and performed weekly physical inventories. However, the inventory results were not reconciled to the property cards, resulting in inaccurate balances on the cards. In addition, there was an inadequate level of separation of duties because the property officer was responsible for procuring, purchasing, receiving, and distributing equipment and supplies. Also, access to the storeroom was not limited during the weekend, when the property officer was off duty.</p>

Recommendations	Status of Corrective Actions
C.2. Appoint a property management officer at the St. Thomas Criminal Justice Complex.	<p>On St. Thomas, the acting property officer did not maintain supply inventory cards and property cards or perform periodic inventory counts. In addition, the property officer was the only person who had access to the storeroom and the only person authorized to accept deliveries of equipment and supplies, which did not provide an adequate level of segregation of duties.</p> <p>Implemented. A property management officer was appointed at the Criminal Justice Complex. That individual resigned in May 1997, but a corrections officer was subsequently assigned the responsibilities of that position.</p>
C.3. Require that the Bureau of Corrections establish policies and procedures to stop the practice of splitting purchases to circumvent the established limit on over-the-counter purchases and to ensure that vendors are paid within the prompt discount periods offered by the vendors.	Not implemented. Policies and procedures were not implemented to stop the practice of splitting purchases and to ensure that vendors are paid within the prompt discount periods offered by the vendors. Therefore, the procurement -related problems identified in the prior audit report still existed.

STATUS OF AUDIT REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding/Recommendation Reference	Status	Action Required
1-6	Unresolved.	Provide a response to each recommendation indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence. If concurrence is indicated, provide an action plan that includes a target date and title of the official responsible for implementation. If nonconcurrence is indicated, provide specific reasons for the nonconcurrence.

CONFIDENTIAL

**ILLEGAL OR WASTEFUL ACTIVITIES
SHOULD BE REPORTED TO
THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL BY:**

Sending written documents to:

Calling:

Within the Continental United States

U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
1849 C Street, N.W.
Mail Stop 5341
Washington, D.C. 20240

Our 24-hour
Telephone HOTLINE
1-800-424-5081 or
(202) 208-5300

TDD for hearing impaired
(202) 208-2420 or
1-800-354-0996

Outside the Continental United States

Caribbean Region ...

U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
Eastern Division - Investigations
4040 Fairfax Drive
Suite 303
Arlington, Virginia 22201

(703) 235-9221

North Pacific Region

U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
North Pacific Region
415 Chalan San Antonio
Baltej Pavilion, Suite 306
Tamuning, Guam 96911

(671) 647-6051

Toll Free Numbers:

1-800-424-5081

TDD 1-800-354-0996

FTS/Commercial Numbers:

(202) 208-5300

TDD (202) 208-2420

HOTLINE

1849 C **Street**, N.W.

Mail Stop 5341

Washington, D.C. 20240

